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Abstract. The singular value decomposition (SVD) is a widely used
matrix factorization tool which underlies plenty of useful applications,
e.g. recommendation system, abnormal detection and data compression.
Under the environment of emerging Internet of Things (IoT), there would
be an increasing demand for data analysis to better human’s lives and
create new economic growth points. Moreover, due to the large scope
of IoT, most of the data analysis work should be done in the network
edge, i.e. handled by fog computing. However, the devices which pro-
vide fog computing may not be trustable while the data privacy is often
the significant concern of the IoT application users. Thus, when per-
forming SVD for data analysis purpose, the privacy of user data should
be preserved. Based on the above reasons, in this paper, we propose a
privacy-preserving fog computing framework for SVD computation. The
security and performance analysis shows the practicability of the pro-
posed framework. Furthermore, since different applications may utilize
the result of SVD operation in different ways, three applications with
different objectives are introduced to show how the framework could
flexibly achieve the purposes of different applications, which indicates
the flexibility of the design.
1 Introduction
With the prosperous development of communication and computation technolo-
gies, the Internet of Things (IoT), which allows the physical objects to be sensed,
accessed and controlled remotely through the network infrastructure, is no longer
a fantasy nowadays. The big advantage of IoT is that with the data analysis on
the huge amount of information collected from the physical world, the server is
capable of making more accurate and optimal decisions which would produce
considerable benefits. It is estimated that the global IoT market will be 14.4
trillion dollars by 2022 [1], the potential economic impact of IoT would be 3.9
to 11.1 trillion dollars by 2025 [2], and the number of devices connected to the
Internet would be about 50 billion by 2020 [3]. It could be expected that rather
than being conducted on the cloud or inside the intranet of companies, the data
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analysis work would be performed everywhere and anytime in the future due
to the ubiquitous IoT. As the amount of data analysis tasks increases in IoT,
the singular value decomposition (SVD), which is widely used in different data
analysis applications [4] [5] [6] [7] [8], will be performed frequently. However, the
traditional way of performing SVD, i.e. calculating the SVD in central server,
may not be practical in future IoT due to the huge amount of IoT devices. If
all the data is transmitted to a central server for computation, it would lead
to considerable computation and communication resource consumption of the
server, which would further severly impact the quality of service (QoS) of IoT
applications.
To ease the burden of the IoT server and guarantee the QoS, a new technique
called fog computing, which is proposed by Cisco [9], is suitable to be applied.
The main idea of fog computing is to provide storage, computing and networking
services between environmental devices and the central server. The fog devices
which are in close proximity to end devices normally possess considerable storage
and computation resource. With the equipped resource, the fog devices could
process the collected data locally so as to loose the workload of the server. In
specific, there are three tiers in the fog computing architecture: environmental
tier, edge tier and central tier. In the environmental tier, there are billions of
heterogeneous IoT devices collecting and uploading information of the physical
world, e.g. medical sensors in eHealth and mobile phone of each people. The data
collected by IoT devices will be transmitted to the edge tier. The distribution
of fog devices in the edge tier are hierarchical which is a characteristic inherited
from the traditional network architecture. For example, the switchers of a local
area network could function as the first layer fog devices and the gateways which
manage those switchers could serve as the second layer fog devices. The fog
devices in the edge tier could perform the application-specific operations on
received data locally and send the results to the server in the central tier. Owing
to the processing of fog devices, the volume of data sent to server could be
reduced to a large extent. Since the fog devices are spread in a highly distributed
environment, it is impractical for the government or an institution which owns
the central server to provide and maintain all those fog devices. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that the fog devices would be supplied by third parties.
Under the context of fog computing, one could perform the SVD operations
on the fog devices. However, another problem which would appear is the privacy
issue. The third parties which control the fog devices may not be trustworthy
while in many IoT applications, the data collected from the environment is con-
sidered as private by the IoT application users, e.g. the vital signs in eHealth,
the location and speed of vehicles, and the power usage in a smart grid. Per-
forming the SVD on plaintext with fog devices is infeasible if the privacy is a
primary concern from the perspective of data owners. Therefore, how to take
advantage of fog computing to locally process data in a privacy-preserving way
is a challenging issue.
In this paper, we propose a flexible fog computing framework for perform-
ing SVD with privacy preserved. The homomorphic encryption technique called
Privacy-preserving Framework for SVD under IoT 3
Paillier encryption [10] is applied to protect the data privacy. The framework is
designed to be capable of supporting different applications based on the SVD
computation. The main contributions of this paper are three-fold.
– First, to perform data analysis for IoT applications, we propose a fog com-
puting framework for SVD computation to ease the burden of server. Since
the computation is performed in the fog devices which may not be trustable,
the framework achieves the privacy-preserving SVD computation.
– Second, there is only one communication round between the data providers
and data processors in our work while most of the existing works require
iterative communications, which brings heavy overhead.
– Third, besides the framework for basic SVD operation, three applications are
introduced in details to demonstrate the flexibility of the framework. It has
been shown that the proposed framework could flexibly adapt to different
applications with slight adjustments or several extra procedures.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, the prelim-
inaries of our scheme are introduced. The system model, security requirements
and design goals are described in Section 3. In Section 4, the proposed frame-
work is presented in details. The security analysis and performance evaluation
are discussed in Section 5 and 6. Three applications based on the proposed
privacy-preserving SVD framework are illustrated in Section 7. In Section 8, we
discuss the related work, and finally conclude our current work in Section 9.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, the Paillier Cryptosystem [10] and Singular Value Decomposition
[11] which are the basis of the proposed framework are reviewed.
2.1 Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier Cryptosystem enables the addition and multiplication operations
on plaintext through the specific linear algebraic manipulation conducted on the
ciphertext. This property is extensively desired in many privacy-preserving ap-
plications [12–14]. In this paper, this feature allows fog devices to process the
user data in encrypted form without leaking the data content. The Paillier Cryp-
tosystem comprises three phases: key generation, encryption and decryption.
– Key Generation: Given one security parameter κ, generate two large prime
numbers p, q, where |p| = |q | = κ. Then compute the RSA modulus n = pq,
λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and choose a generator g ∈ Z∗
n2
. Define the function
L(u) = u−1n and calculate µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n. Then PK = (n, g) is
published as the public key and SK = (λ, µ) is kept as the corresponding
private key.
– Encryption: Given a message m ∈ Zn, randomly choose a number r ∈ Z∗n, the
ciphertext could be calculated as c = E(m, r) = gm · rn mod n2.
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– Decryption: Given the ciphertext c ∈ Z∗
n2
, the corresponding plaintext could
be recovered as m = D(c) = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n. Note that, the Paillier
Cryptosystem is provably secure against chosen plaintext attack, and the
correctness and security can be referred to [10].
The homomorphic property of the Paillier Cryptosystem utilized in this work is:
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 + m2, r1 · r2).
2.2 Singular Value Decomposition
SVD is a powerful and popular matrix factorization tool that underlies plenty of
useful applications, e.g. abnormal detection [4,5], recommendation system [6] [7]
and data compression [8]. Let A be a l × N matrix, the SVD of A is of the form
UΣVT where T means conjugate transpose, U is a l × l unitary matrix, Σ is a
l × N rectangular diagonal matrix with non-negative diagonal values, and V is
an N ×N unitary matrix. The non-negative diagonal entries of Σ are the singular
values of matrix A while the columns of U and V are known as the left-singular
vectors and right-singular vectors of A. Note that we only consider real matrix
entries in this paper, thus the conjugate transpose T could be simply regarded
as transpose.
Another widely used matrix factorization tool is the eigenvalue decomposi-
tion. Unlike SVD which could be applied to any l × N matrix, the eigenvalue
decomposition is less general and could only be performed on square matrix.
However, the two kinds of tool are closely related shown as follow:
A · AT = UΣVTVΣTUT = UΣΣTUT
AT · A = VΣTUTUΣVT = VΣTΣVT (1)
It is obvious that the left-singular vectors U is the eigenvectors of A · AT , the
right-singular vectors V is the eigenvectors of AT · A and the singular values Σ
are the square root of the eigenvalues of A · AT and AT · A. We will show that
the above relation could be utilized to achieve the privacy-preserving SVD in
the later sections.
3 System Model, Security Requirements and Design
Goals
In this section, we describe the system model, discuss the security requirements
and identify the design goals on privacy-preserving SVD.
3.1 System Model
In this work, we mainly focus on how to utilize the fog computing to compute
the SVD of the data uploaded by environmental devices with privacy preserved.
Specifically, there are four categories of entity in the system model, namely
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Environmental Device (ED) 1 
ED 2 
ED n 
ED i 
Send the randomized data 
to second-layer device 
Randomize 
collected data 
Send decryption results Send decryption results 
Second-Layer Fog Device 
(For Decryption) 
First-Layer Fog Devices 
Second-Layer Fog Device 
(For Decomposing AAT) 
Second-Layer Fog Device 
(For Decomposing ATA) 
Server 
Upload 
aggregated data 
Fig. 1. System Model
server, first layer fog device, second layer fog device and environmental device
as shown in Fig. 1.
Server: server is a fully trustable entity located in the central tier. It is
responsible for initializing the whole system and distributing key materials to
others. The other operations the server may conduct are application-specific.
Serval examples will be given in Section 7.
Environmental Device (ED): EDs are the devices distributed in the envi-
ronmental layer of IoT environment. The analysis on the data uploaded by EDs
could enable better decision-making.
First Layer Fog Device (FD): FDs are the fog devices which communicate
with EDs directly. FDs process the collected data and upload the results to the
second layer fog devices.
Second Layer Fog Device (SD): SDs are the fog devices which commu-
nicate with FDs. Compared to FDs, SDs are closer to the server and do not
contact with EDs directly. In the proposed framework, there are three SDs play-
ing different roles for SVD operation. One of them is responsible for decrypting
the messages from FDs. The other two are in charge of decomposing A ·AT and
AT ·A. We denote the one for decryption, decomposing A ·AT and decomposing
AT · A as SDd, SDu and SDv respectively.
The basic workflow of our model is: the server first initializes the whole sys-
tem and distributes the key materials or secrets to other entities accordingly.
After initialization, EDs start to collect and upload application-specific data as
required. Each data transmitted to FDs is encrypted. After FDs gather the data
from EDs, FDs will randomize the collected data and send the results to SDd.
Upon decrypting the encrypted data from FDs, SDd will perform further opera-
tions on the plaintext and send the outcomes to SDu and SDv respectively. With
the messages from SDd, SDu and SDv could recover AA
T and ATA, and conduct
the eigenvalue decomposition accordingly. Finally, the SVD of data collection is
split into two parts which are held by SDu and SDv seperately.
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3.2 Security Requirements
Security is fundamental for the effectiveness of proposed framework. In this work,
the server and EDs are assumed to be trustable. The fog devices, i.e. FDs and
SDs, are assumed to be honest-but-curious [15,16] which means they will follow
the specified procedures faithfully while being curious about the uploaded data.
In addition, FDs and SDs are assumed not to collude with each other. The non-
collusion assumption could be realized similarly as the EigenTrust scheme [17].
Briefly speaking, for each SVD computation, the server chooses fog devices based
on distributed hash table. Due to the large number of fog devices, it is infeasible
for the device providers to determine whether they would be selected for the
same computation and negotiate for collusion in advance. Based on the above
assumptions, the confidentiality as the security requirement should be fulfilled,
i.e. even FDs and SDs process the collected data, they could not learn anything
about the actual value of data. For authenticity and integrity, since there are
many existing signature schemes for them, e.g. Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS)
short signature [18], this work focuses on confidentiality.
3.3 Design Goals
According to the aforementioned system model and security requirements, the
goal is to design a flexible fog computing framework for privacy-preserving SVD
computation. Specifically, the proposed framework should achieve the following
objectives.
– The confidentiality should be guaranteed in the proposed framework. All the
user data contained in the transmitted messages should be protected. The
processing in fog devices should not leak data privacy.
– The framework should be flexible enough to be adopted by different applica-
tions. Instead of being the ultimate goal, SVD is the basis or initial step of
many applications, which means the further procedures after SVD could be
quite different for various scenarios. Therefore, the design of the framework
should consider the flexibility such that the results of SVD could be further
utilized to achieve the final purposes of different applications.
4 The Proposed Framework
In this section, the proposed framework for SVD computation is presented in
details. The framework is composed of five phases: system initialization, data
collection, data randomization, pre-computation and eigenvalue decomposition.
4.1 System Initialization
The server is the trustable entity which bootstraps the whole system. Assume the
amount of users supported by the system is N, each user data is l-dimensional
and the range for each dimension value is [0, d] where d is a constant. The
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system parameters are κ, κ1, κ2 and κ3. Let | • | denote the bit length of •. Given
the parameter κ, the server calculates the public key for Paillier Cryptosystem
PK : (n = pq, g), and the corresponding private key SK : (λ, µ), where p, q are
two large primes with |p| = |q | = κ. Given the parameters κ1, κ2 and κ3, let
t = 2κ1 , the server randomly chooses two coprime integers W and S such that
W > max(N, l)·d2 and S > max(N, l)·(d2 + 2tWd + t2W2), where |W | = κ2 and |S | =
κ3. Then, the server chooses one superincreasing sequence ®a = (a1 = 1, a2, · · · , al)
such that
∑i−1
j=1 aj · (d + tW + tS) < ai for i = 2, · · · , l and
∑l
i=1 ai · (d + tW + tS) < n.
Finally, the server publishes {n, g, ®a} as public parameters, sends (λ, µ) to SDd
as secret, and sends (W, S) to FDs, SDu and SDv as secret respectively.
4.2 Data Collection
In the environmental tier, EDs collect and upload the application-specific l-
dimensional data (d1, · · · , dl)T . The data from N EDs could form the data matrix
A.
A =
©­­­­«
d11 d12 . . . d1N
d21 d22 . . . d2N
...
...
. . .
...
dl1 dl2 . . . dlN
ª®®®®¬
To compute the SVD of matrix A with privacy preserved is the goal of this work.
The ith column of matrix A (d1i, · · · , dli)T is the data from the ith device EDi.
To upload the data, EDi performs the following steps:
– Step-1. Utilize the superincreasing ®a to compute
mi = a1d1i + a2d2i + · · · + aldli (2)
– Step-2. Choose a random number ri ∈ Z∗n and compute
Ci = gmi · rni mod n2 (3)
– Step-3. Send the encrypted data Ci | |EDi to the FD which communicates
with it.
4.3 Data Randomization
For each FD, it will perform the following steps to randomize the received data.
– Step-1. For the ith data Ci, FD chooses 2 · l random numbers which are
(z1i, · · · , zli)T and (r1i, · · · , rli)T from the range [1, t]. Then FD computes rz =∑l
k=1 ak · (zki ·W + rki · S).
– Step-2. FD randomizes Ci as
Ci
′
= Ci · grz mod n2
= g
∑l
k=1 ak ·dki · g
∑l
k=1 ak ·(zki ·W+rki ·S) · rni mod n2
= g
∑l
k=1 ak ·(dki+zki ·W+rki ·S) · rni mod n2
(4)
– Step-3. FD sends the randomized data Ci
′
to SDd.
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4.4 Pre-computation
Upon receiving N data from FDs, SDd will perform the following steps to com-
pute the randomized AAT and ATA.
– Step-1. For each Ci
′
, SDd will utilize the secret key (λ, µ) to decrypt it and
get the aggregation of randomized data
mi
′
=
l∑
k=1
ak · (dki + zki ·W + rki · S) mod n (5)
– Step-2. Through running the Algorithm 1, SDd could recover the randomized
value for each dimension of data i.
Algorithm 1 Recover randomized value from aggregated data
1: procedure Recover randomized value of each dimension
Input: ®a = (a1 = 1, · · · , al) and mi ′
Output: Randomized data
2: Let ®Tempa = (ta1, · · · , tal)T
3: Set Xl = mi
′
4: for k = l to 2 do
5: Xk−1 = Xk mod ak
6: tak =
Xk−Xk−1
ak
= dki + zki ·W + rki · S
7: end for
8: ta1 = X1 = d1i + z1i ·W + r1i · S
9: return (ta1, · · · , tal)T
10: end procedure
– Step-3. From each mi
′
, SDd could get an l-dimensional randomized data. In
total, SDd could get the randomized data matrix
A
′
=
©­­­­«
d
′
11 d
′
12 . . . d
′
1N
d
′
21 d
′
22 . . . d
′
2N
...
...
. . .
...
d
′
l1
d
′
l2
. . . d
′
lN
ª®®®®¬
The (i, j)th entry of A′ is d′i j = di j + zi j ·W +ri j ·S. Then SDd simply computes
A
′ · (A′)T and (A′)T · A′ , and sends the two resulting matrices to SDu and
SDv respectively.
The correctness of Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, Xl = mi
′
= a1 · (d1i + z1i ·
W +r1i ·S)+ · · ·+al−1 · (d(l−1)i+ z(l−1)i ·W +r(l−1)i ·S)+al · (dli+ zli ·W +rli ·S)] mod n.
Since the data value for each dimension is in the range of [0, d], and zki and rki
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are chosen from [1, t], we have
a1 · (d1i + z1i ·W + r1i · S) + · · · + al−1 · (d(l−1)i + z(l−1)i ·W + r(l−1)i · S)
<a1 · (d + tW + tS) + · · · + al−1 · (d + tW + tS)
=
l−1∑
k=1
ak · (d + tW + tS) < al
(6)
Therefore, Xl−1 = Xl mod al = a1 · (d1i + z1i ·W +r1i · S)+ · · ·+al−1 · (d(l−1)i + z(l−1)i ·
W + r(l−1)i · S), and
Xl − Xl−1
al
=
al · (dli + zli ·W + rli · S)
al
= dli + zli ·W + rli · S
(7)
Similarly, it can be proved that tak = dki + zki ·W + rki · S, for k = 1, · · · , l − 1.
4.5 Eigenvalue Decomposition
SDu: When receiving A
′ · (A′)T , SDu will perform the following steps to compute
the left part of the SVD for matrix A, i.e. matrix U and Σ.
– Step-1. For each entry eu
′
of A
′ · (A′)T , SDu derandomizes the entry as follow:
eu = eu
′
mod S mod W (8)
The result eu is the corresponding entry of matrix A · AT .
– Step-2. After SDu recovers the matrix A ·AT , it performs eigenvalue decom-
position for matrix A · AT and gets the matrix U and Σ.
SDv: Similar as SDu, SDv will derandomize the entries of received (A′)T · A′ to
recover the matrix AT · A. Then SDv performs the eigenvalue decomposition on
AT · A to get the right part of A’s SVD, i.e. matrix V and Σ.
By now, the SVD of A has been seperately held by SDu and SDv.
The correctness of derandomization The (i, j)th entry eu ′i j of A
′ · (A′)T
is implicitly formed as
eu
′
i j =
N∑
k=1
d
′
ik · d
′
jk =
N∑
k=1
(dik + zik ·W + rik · S) · (djk + zjk ·W + rjk · S)
=
N∑
k=1
dik · djk +
N∑
k=1
[(zikdjk + zjkdik)W + zik zjkW2]
+ S
N∑
k=1
[(rikdjk + rjkdik) + (zikrjk + zjkrik)W + rikrjkS]
(9)
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Since∑N
k=1 dikdjk +
∑N
k=1[(zikdjk + zjkdik)W + zik zjkW2] < N(d2 + 2tdW + t2W2) < S,
we have eu
′
i j mod S =
∑N
k=1 dikdjk +
∑N
k=1[(zikdjk + zjkdik)W + zik zjkW2]. Also, we
have
∑N
k=1 dikdjk < Nd
2 < W . Thus, (eu ′i j mod S) mod W =
∑N
k=1 dikdjk which is
the (i, j)th entry of matrix A · AT .
Similarly, for the (i, j)th entry ev ′i j of matrix (A
′)T · A′ , we have (ev ′i j mod
S) mod W = ∑lk=1 dki · dk j which is the (i, j)th entry of matrix AT · A.
5 Security Analysis
In this section, the security properties of the proposed framework are analysed.
As mentioned in the security requirements of Section 3, the participants of the
framework will faithfully follow the defined work procedures while being curious
about the user data. Thus, we first analyze the ability of each participant to
learn private data under normal operations, i.e. the probability of leaking privacy
when following legal processes. Then, the possible extra operations, denoted as
potential attacks, which could be conducted by certain participants to snoop
data are analyzed. The resistance of the framework against those attacks is
discussed and the principles for system configuration are demonstrated.
5.1 Privacy Leakage Probability under Normal Operations
EDs: In the proposed framework, each ED will encrypt its data with Paillier
Cryptosystem before uploading. Thus, each ED could only know the plaintext
of its own message and learn nothing about the other EDs’ data.
FDs: The messages collected by the FDs are all Paillier ciphertext. Since the
FDs do not have the private key for decrypting messages and it is assumed
that there is no collusion among fog devices, the user data privacy is protected
by the Paillier Cryptosystem no matter what operations are performed on the
ciphertext by FDs.
SDd: SDd is the only fog device which has the private key for decryption.
However, the plaintexts SDd could get are the randomized data, i.e. di j
′
= di j +
zi jW + ri jS, for i = 1, · · · , l and j = 1, · · · , N. Since SDd has no idea about the
value of zi j, ri j,W and S, it could not gain any knowledge of the original data.
SDu: Through derandomizing A
′ · (A′)T , SDu obtains A · AT and further gets
U and Σ. Since A = UΣVT , SDu needs to find the correct unitary matrix V to
determine A. Since there are infinite unitary matrices, SDu could not recover
original data matrix A with only U and Σ.
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SDv: Similar as SDu, SDv could not recover data matrix A with only V and Σ.
Based on the above analysis, the data privacy is totally preserved in the
proposed framework when the participants follow the defined procedures. In the
following, the possible extra computations performed by participants to discover
private data are considered.
5.2 Potential Attacks
For EDs and FDs, since they only have encrypted user data, they could not
get any meaningful information no matter what operations they perform on the
ciphertext. Therefore, we mainly discuss the potential attacks from SDd, SDu
and SDv in this part.
• SDd: As mentioned above, the information SDd gets is the randomized data
di j
′
= di j + zi jW + ri jS, for i = 1, · · · , l and j = 1, · · · , N. What SDd needs to do is
to find the value of S and W and recover the original data as
di j = di j
′
mod S mod W (10)
Since di j is mixed with the random combination of S and W , it is infeasible
for SDd to determine S and W without additional information. Therefore, we
consider the situations in which SDd knows some of the user data. With the
knowledge of user data, the possible operations SDd could do are as follows:
– Step-1. For each known data, SDd converts the corresponding randomized
data to the form zW + rS by computing d
′ − d. Let LC denote the set of
converted data and LCi = ziW + riS denote the ith element of LC.
– Step-2. SDd performs the brute force attack, i.e. tries all possible S. For each
try, SDd performs (modulo S) operation on each LCi. Then SDd computes
the greatest common divisor (GCD) of the resulting set. If the GCD is larger
than 1, it is the value of W and the currently selected S is the correct S.
The rationale behind this attack is: the probability of k randomly chosen
integers being coprime is 1ς(k) , where ς(x) is Riemann zeta function [19]. When k
is large, the probability that they are not coprime is negligible. Thus, after the
modulo operations on LC, only when the chosen S is correct, the elements of the
resulting set are of the form zW and have a GCD larger than 1, which is W .
Note that, in some cases, SDd could still form a set, in which the elements
are of the form zW + rS with high probability, even it does not know any user
data. For example, if the data matrix is sparse, most of the randomized data is
already of the desired form. Another case is that data range is not large enough
compared to the amount of data, SDd could compute DV = d
′
i j − d
′
i
′
j
′ for all
possible pairwise combinations (d′i j, d
′
i
′
j
′ ) and some of the resulting DVs will be
of the desired form. For those cases, SDd could perform the brute force attack.
Parameter Selection. To resist the brute force attack in the possible cases,
|S |, i.e. κ3, should be at least equal to 80. Moreover, SDd could compute LDV =
LCi − LCj for all possible combinations (LCi, LCj). If certain combinations have
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the same zW inside, those resulting LDVs would be of the form (ri − rj)S. SDd
could learn S efficiently by computing the GCD of those LDVs even when |S | ≥
80. To avoid the case, the randomly chosen zi j should be different with each other
with high probability. The zi j is chosen from the range [1, t], and the total number
of zi j is l ·N. According to the generalized birthday problem [20], the probability
of at least two chosen zi j match is 1 − exp −(lN )
2
2t . Thus, the probability of no
match is exp
−(lN )2
2t and the parameter κ1 which determines t could be selected
accordingly. Note that if FDs could cooperatively choose the set of zi j such that
there is no match, then the range t only needs to be larger than l · N.
• SDu: SDu could get U, Σ and UΣ:
U =
©­­­­«
u11 u12 . . . u1l
u21 u22 . . . u2l
...
...
. . .
...
ul1 ul2 . . . ull
ª®®®®¬
Σ =
©­­­­­­­­­«
σ1 0 . . . 0 0 0
0 σ2 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 . . . σλ 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0
ª®®®®®®®®®¬
UΣ =
©­­­­«
σ1u11 σ2u12 . . . σλu1λ 0 0
σ1u21 σ2u22 . . . σλu2λ 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
σ1ul1 σ2ul2 . . . σλulλ 0 0
ª®®®®¬
where λ is the rank of A. The purpose of SDu is to find the matrix V:
V =
©­­­­«
v11 v12 . . . v1N
v21 v22 . . . v2N
...
...
. . .
...
vN1 vN2 . . . vNN
ª®®®®¬
Note that the first λ elements of each row in V correspond to a column of A.
If SDu knows the left λ columns of V, it could recover the original data. Since
there are infinite unitary matrices, SDu could not determine the correct V if it
has no additional information. Thus, we assume that SDu could get N
′
original
data in some cases. Note that using one data, i.e. one column of A, could form l
equations for the same row of V. Solving the equations from one user data, SDu
could determine the first λ elements of that row.
When N
′
< N−1, since each row of V is linearly independent with each other,
obtaining one row does not help to learn the other rows. Thus, SDu could not
utilize the known data to learn the rest unknown data.
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When N
′
= N − 1, SDu could determine the first λ elements of (N − 1) rows
of V, then the first λ elements of the last unknown row could be determined due
to
∑N
i=1 v
2
i j = 1. The last unknown user data could be recovered accordingly.
• SDv: Similar as SDu, the matrix which could be utilized by SDv is ΣVT :
ΣVT =
©­­­­­­­­­­­«
σ1v11 σ1v21 . . . σ1vN1
σ2v12 σ2v22 . . . σ2vN2
...
...
. . .
...
σλv1λ σλv2λ . . . σλvNλ
0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0
ª®®®®®®®®®®®¬
where λ is the rank of A. The purpose of SDv is to find the matrix U:
U =
©­­­­«
u11 u12 . . . u1l
u21 u22 . . . u2l
...
...
. . .
...
ul1 ul2 . . . ull
ª®®®®¬
Different from the case of SDu, the first λ elements of each row in U correspond
to a row of A, i.e. the data value of a certain dimension from all users. If SDv
knows the left λ columns of U, it could recover the original data. Similarly, we
assume that SDv could get N
′
linearly independent user data in some cases.
We have ”linearly independent” here because linearly dependent data would not
produce new linearly independent equations. Thus, only the number of linearly
independent data matters. Each user data ®di, i.e. one column of A, could form
one equation for each row of U:
σ1vi1 · u11 + · · · + σλviλu1λ = d1i
...
σ1vi1 · ul1 + · · · + σλviλulλ = dli
(11)
When λ < l, if N
′
= λ, SDv could form λ linearly independent equations
for each row of U. Then through solving equations, SDv could determine the
left λ columns of U and thus recover the whole A which contains the other
unknown user data. On the other hand, if N
′
< λ, SDv could not recover the
other unknown linearly independent data due to the lack of enough linearly
independent equations. However, for the data which is linearly dependent with
the known data, SDv could recover them because the columns of ΣV
T have the
same linear relationship as those existing among user data.
When λ = l, there is an additional condition for solving the equations of U,
i.e. U is a unitary matrix. Specifically, the l rows of U could be regarded as the
coordinate axis of l-dimensional space whose rotation degree of freedom is l − 1.
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For each linearly independent data known to SDv, the rotation degree of freedom
of the coordinate axis reduces by 1. Therefore, if N
′
= l − 1, the rotation degree
of freedom of the coordinate axis reduces to 0, i.e. the coordinate axis is fixed.
Moreover, since
∑l
j=1 u
2
i j = 1, each row of U could be seen as a point locating on
the unit sphere of l-dimension. Thus, the intersection points between the fixed
coordinate axis and the l-dimensional unit sphere is the solution of U.
Based on the above analysis, the proposed framework could resist the poten-
tial attacks launched by SDd through properly choosing zi j and S. For SDu, only
when (N − 1) user data is obtained, it could learn the value of the last unknown
data. For SDv, if λ < l, the framework could resist not more than (λ−1) linearly
independent user data leakage and it could resist not more than (λ − 2) linearly
independent user data leakage if λ = l.
6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed fog computing
framework in terms of the capacity and efficiency. The capacity demonstrates the
number of required ciphertexts for different matrix sizes while the efficiency indi-
cates the computational complexity and communication overhead of the frame-
work.
6.1 Capacity
In the proposed framework, the aggregated randomized data is of the form
mi
′
=
∑l
k=1 ak · (dki + zki ·W + rki · S). To guarantee the aggregated data could
be recovered correctly through decryption, mi
′
should be less than n, i.e. the
constraint
∑l
k=1 ak · (d + tW + tS) < n must be fulfilled. At the same time, the su-
perincreasing sequence ®a needs to meet the constraint: ∑i−1j=1 aj · (d+ tW + tS) < ai
for i = 2, · · · , l. Moreover, in order to successfully derandomize the data, W and
S need to fulfill: W > max(N, l) · d2 and S > max(N, l) · (d2 + 2tWd + t2W2). To
resist the potential attacks from SDd, the value of t should be chosen based on
N and l, and κ3 should not be less than 80.
Let κN, κl and κd denote the bit length of N, l and d respectively. To resist the
attacks from SDd, κ1 should be larger than κN + κl. For simplicity, assume that
FDs could cooperatively select the zi j such that no match happens. Then κ1 =
κN + κl +1 is enough. To meet W > max(N, l) · d2, we have κ2 > max(κN, κl)+2κd.
Then due to S > max(N, l) · (d2 + 2tWd + t2W2), κ3 > max(κN, κl) + 2κ1 + 2κ2 >
3 · max(κN, κl) + 4κd + 2κN + 2κl + 2. For the superincreasing sequence ®a, |a2 | >
κ3 + κ1 and |a3 | > 2(κ3 + κ1). It is easy to find that |ai | > (i − 1)(κ3 + κ1) and
|∑lk=1 ak · (d + tW + tS)| > l(κ3 + κ1). Thus, the bit length of aggregated data:
|mi ′ | =
{
l[3max(κN, κl) + 4κd + 3κN + 3κl + 3] , if max(κN, κl) + 2κ1 + 2κ2 > 80.
l(80 + κN + κl + 1) , else.
It is obvious that the data dimension has a great influence on the aggregated
data length. Given different κd and l, the number of users which one ciphertext
with |n| = 1024 could support is evaluated as shown in Fig. 2(a).
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Fig. 2. Capacity of the proposed framework
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From Fig. 2(a), it could be seen that the increase of dimensionality could
dramatically decrease the number of users which one ciphertext could support,
while the impact of data range d is not that significant. One ciphertext could
support large number of users with low dimensional data, e.g. 237 users with
4-dimensional data and 215 users with 8-dimensional data. To support higher
dimensional data for the same amount of users, each ED needs to use multiple
ciphertexts to aggregate data, e.g. to support 215 users with 16-dimensional data
needs 2 ciphertexts each of which aggregates 8 dimensions. Given different l and
κN , the number of required ciphertexts with |n| = 1024 is evaluated in Fig. 2(b)
and Fig. 2(c) respectively. It could be seen that each ED needs to use O(l ·log(N))
ciphertexts for uploading data.
6.2 Efficiency
As analyzed above, each ED may need more than one Paillier ciphertext for
aggregating user data. Let NC denote the number of required ciphertexts for
each ED. In the following, the computational complexity and communication
overhead of the proposed framework are analyzed.
Computational Complexity: Since the crypto-operations are much heavier
than the computations on plaintext, the amount of crypto-operations is the main
concern in this part. The overall crypto-operations performed by each entity in
the procedures of proposed framework are shown as follow.
• ED: each encryption needs 2 exponentiation and 1 multiplication in Zn2 .
The overall crypto-operations conducted by an ED is 2 · NC exponentiation and
NC multiplication in Zn2 .
• FD: each randomization needs 1 exponentiation and 1 multiplication in
Zn2 . Assuming the number of EDs communicating with the FD is Ne, the overall
crypto-operations performed by a FD is Ne ·NC exponentiation and multiplication
in Zn2 respectively.
• SDd: to decrypt one ciphertext, SDd needs to perform 1 exponentiation
operation in Zn2 . After decryption, the other operations are conducted on plain-
texts and those cost is negligible compared to decryption. The overall crypto-
operations conducted by the SDd is N · NC exponentiation in Zn2 .
Note that SDu and SDv only perform computations on plaintext, and server
is only in charge of system initialization. Therefore, their computation cost is
negligible compared to the other entities.
Since the fog computing platform in current stage possesses the resource com-
parable to that of a smart phone, we have implemented the Paillier Cryptosys-
tem on an Android mobile phone. The model number of the phone is Huawei
Honor 3C (H30-U10) with the system parameters as: ARM Cortex-A7 4-core
CPU @1.3GHz, 2GB memory and 4.2.2 Android version. When |n| = 1024, the
average running time (1000 iterations) for the exponentiation in Zn2 is 55.493
milliseconds, the time for the multiplication in Zn2 is 0.201 milliseconds and
the time for the multiplication in Zn is 0.101 milliseconds. It is obvious that
the cost of multiplication is negligible compared to that of exponentiation. The
computational cost for different entities is as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Computational Cost of the Proposed Framework
Entity Computational Cost (milliseconds)
ED 2 × 55.493 · NC
FDs 55.493 · N · NC
SDd 55.493 · N · NC
Another notable thing is that the evaluation here implicitly assumes the IoT
environment devices are as powerful as the smart phone. This is true for some
IoT applications which use mobile phones or vehicles to upload environmental
information. However, for the applications utilizing low power sensors as EDs,
the Paillier operations are still too heavy. To circumvent this issue, the sensor
may transmit its data to nearby more powerful device for conducting the crypto-
operations. For example, the wristband could connect with the mobile phone for
processing and uploading data.
Communication Overhead: In this part, the communication overhead during
SVD computation is evaluated. Note that for Paillier Cryptosystem, the cipher-
text space is Zn2 . Thus, the bit length of one ciphertext is 2|n|. The overhead of
each communication flow is as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Communication Overhead of the Proposed Framework
Communication Flow Bit Length of Message
ED→ FD NC · 2|n|
FDs → SDd N · NC · 2|n|
SDd → SDu l2(2κ1 + 2κ3 + κN )
SDd → SDv N2(2κ1 + 2κ3 + κl)
For the ”ED→ FD” communication flow, each ED transits total NC cipher-
texts to its corresponding FD, so the communication overhead is NC · 2|n|. For
the ”FDs→ SDd” communication flow, the overall ciphertexts SDd gathers from
all the FDs is N · NC , so the communication overhead is N · NC · 2|n|. For the
”SDd → SDu” communication flow, SDd sends A′ · (A′)T to SDu. Since the bit
length of each entry in A
′ · (A′)T is (2κ1 + 2κ3 + κN ) and there are total l2 entries,
the communication overhead is l2(2κ1 + 2κ3 + κN ). Similarly, the communication
overhead for the ”SDd → SDv” communication flow is N2(2κ1 + 2κ3 + κl).
7 Applications
In this section, we describe the potential IoT applications which could utilize
the proposed framework. Basically, the proposed framework could be applied if
the application possesses the following characteristics: 1) the application collects
the environmental information for data analysis; 2) the data analysis is based
on SVD; 3) the number of data analysis tasks is huge; 4) the environmental
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information is considered as privacy by the application users. Actually, the last
two characteristics are the motivation of this work. The large amount of data
analysis tasks motivates us to analyze data on fog computing platform. The
privacy concern requires the analysis being privacy-preserving. Moreover, since
different applications may utilize the result of SVD operation in different ways,
we discuss how to adopt the proposed framework to achieve the purposes of
different applications. In the following, three applications with different objec-
tives are given as example to show that we only need to add several additional
procedures or make some slight adjustments, the framework could be adapted
to specific applications, which means the proposed framework is flexible.
7.1 Abnormal Detection
Since SVD could find the singular values of data matrix which reflect the fea-
tures of data, it has proposed to apply SVD or the closely related technique–
principal component analysis into abnormal detection [4] [5]. The basic idea is
quite straightforward: since the abnormal data would cause higher variation on
the first eigenvector than the normal data, the variation degree of the first eigen-
vector could be utilized as the indicator of abnormal. When new data comes in,
the system could perform SVD on the data matrix and check how much the direc-
tion of the first eigenvector changes. Note that to get the correct first eigenvector,
it is usually required to normalize the data before performing SVD. However,
the currently proposed framework is the general form which does not contain
the normalization procedure. Thus, in the below, we show how to adjust the
framework to accomplish that goal. Note that the eigenvector used for detection
is from matrix U, thus we only need to make adjustments on the procedures
which are related to computing U.
To include the normalization procedure, the W and S need to be chosen
such that W > 2N3d2 and S > 2N3(d2 + 2tWd + t2W2). Then, it needs to add
some extra steps in the pre-computation operation of SDd and derandomization
operation of SDu. The extra steps are shown as follows.
– Step-1. For each randomized data d
′
ik
, SDd performs
d∗ik = N · d
′
ik −
N∑
m=1
d
′
im (12)
Then SDd performs matrix multiplication as before and sends the resulting
A
′ · (A′)T to SDu.
– Step-2. For each entry e of A
′ · (A′)T , SDu computes e′ = e mod S first. If
e
′
> N3(d2 + 2tWd + t2W2), SDu further computes e′ = e′ − S. Then SDu
computes e
′′
= e
′
mod W . If e
′′
> N3d2, SDu further computes e
′′
= e
′′ −W .
At last, SDu computes e
′′
= e
′′
N2
. We denote the resulting matrix as A∗ · (A∗)T .
– Step-3. Let e∗i j denote the ith row and jth column entry of A
∗ · (A∗)T . SDu
computes the standard deviation of the ith dimensional data as
δi =
√
e∗ii
N − 1 (13)
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Then for each entry e∗i j , SDu computes e
∗
i j =
e∗i j
δiδ j
. Finally, the resulting
matrix is the correlation matrix generated from normalized data. The SDu
could perform eigenvalue decomposition on the matrix as defined in the
framework to find the first eigenvector and perform detection. One additional
advantage of the proposed framework is that when new data arrives or the
server wants to delete certain data, SDd only needs to add or substract the
related randomized data, which is very convenient.
The correctness of normalization. The d∗
ik
is implicitly formed by
d∗ik = N · d
′
ik −
N∑
m=1
d
′
im
= (Ndik −
N∑
m=1
dim) + (Nzik −
N∑
m=1
zim)W + (Nrik −
N∑
m=1
rim)S
(14)
Let dˆik denote (Ndik − ∑Nm=1 dim), zˆik denote (Nzik − ∑Nm=1 zim) and rˆik denote
(Nrik −∑Nm=1 rim). We have −Nd < dˆik < Nd, −Nt < zˆik < Nt and −Nt < rˆik < Nt.
The (i, j)th entry of A′ · (A′)T is implicitly formed by
ei j =
N∑
k=1
d∗ik · d∗jk
=
N∑
k=1
dˆik · dˆjk +
N∑
k=1
[(zˆik dˆjk + zˆjk dˆik)W + zˆik zˆjkW2]
+ S
N∑
k=1
[(rˆik dˆjk + ˆrjk dˆik) + (zˆik ˆrjk + zˆjk rˆik)W + rˆik ˆrjkS]
(15)
It is easy to infer that −N3d2 < ∑Nk=1 dˆik ·dˆjk < N3d2 and −N3(d2+2tWd+t2W2) <∑N
k=1 dˆik · dˆjk +
∑N
k=1[(zˆik · dˆjk + zˆjk · dˆik) ·W + zˆik zˆjkW2] < N3(d2+2tWd+ t2W2). On
the other hand, we have S > 2N3(d2 + 2tWd + t2W2) and W > 2N3d2. Thus, if
e
′
i j , which is (ei j mod S), is larger than N3(d2 + 2tWd + t2W2), it means
∑N
k=1 dˆik ·
dˆjk +
∑N
k=1[(zˆik · dˆjk + zˆjk · dˆik) ·W + zˆik zˆjkW2] < 0 and SDu needs to substract S
from the e
′
i j to get the correct result. Similarly, when e
′′
i j , which is (e
′
i j mod W),
is larger than N3d2, it means
∑N
k=1 dˆik · dˆjk < 0, SDu needs to substract W .
Therefore, during Step-2, SDu could recover the value of e
′′
i j =
∑N
k=1 dˆik · dˆjk .
It is obvious that e∗i j =
e
′′
i j
N2
=
∑N
k=1(dik − 1N
∑N
m=1 dim)(djk − 1N
∑N
m=1 djm) and√
e∗ii
N−1 =
√∑N
k=1(dik− 1N
∑N
m=1 dim)2
N−1 = δi. The last step of dividing standard deviation
is also straightforward.
7.2 Localized Recommendation System
SVD is also the underlying matrix factorization algorithm of Latent Semantic
Indexing (LSI) which is widely used in information retrieval. Therefore, SVD
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is capable of capturing the latent relationships among customers and products.
In this part, we describe how to utilize the proposed framework to build up a
recommendation system.
Imagine that there are tens of restaurants in the local region where you
live. You have already been some of them and want to try a new one, let’s say
restaurant p, tonight. Before you go there, you would like to get a reputation
score about p from other people in the same region. If the score is too low, you
may change the plan. We call the recommendation of local resource as localized
recommendation. One may wonder why we consider a localized food recommen-
dation system when there are already some centralized food review sites. The
reason is that the localized food recommendation system has three advantages
over the centralized food review sites. In specific, the first advantage is that the
localized food recommendation system allows much more small restaurants to
be included in the system while the centralized food review sites normally only
have the data of the restaurants of middle or larger size. For example, the can-
teens in a university campus or even the food windows inside a canteen could
be recorded in the localized food recommendation system while it is hardly pos-
sible for the centralized food review sites to maintain the information of the
vast amount of tiny food stalls. The second advantage is that the rating vectors
uploaded by the reviewers in the localized food recommendation system could
often provide meaningful recommendations to the query user because those peo-
ple live in the same local region and they are likely to have been in the same
restaurants. Thus, the size of data matrix required in localized recommendation
system is much smaller. The third advantage is that the localized food recom-
mendation system could handle the service variance better. To be specific, the
rating in the centralized food review sites often just reflects a single experience
of the reviewer. However, the service of the restaurant may change over time,
which reduces the information value contained in the rating. For the localized
food recommendation system, the ratings keep being updated since people revisit
the local restaurants frequently. Considering this effect, if a user has not been
a local restaurant for a relatively long time, he would also require an updated
reputation score from the localized recommendation system.
Since the personal taste is considered as privacy by many people and the rec-
ommendation tasks could appear in different regions frequently and concurrently,
to get the local reputation score, we should utilize the proposed framework to
conduct the SVD-based collaborative filtering as described in [6]. The detailed
procedures are as follows:
– Step-1. The user c uploads his rating vector to FD with his mobile phone
and informs FD that he is interested in restaurant p. FD collects the rating
vectors from other users inside this region. Note that to remove sparsity,
each user fills in the ratings of unknown restaurants with his average rating.
– Step-2. FD uploads randomized data to SDd. SDd, SDu and SDv conduct
some extra steps for normalizing the data matrix and perform SVD to get
U, V and Σ. The extra normalization steps of SDd and SDu are the same as
the extra steps introduced in the above ”Abnormal Detection” application.
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Note that different with the ”Abnormal Detection” application, the recom-
mendation application requires SDd to send the (A′)T · A′ to SDv as well.
Since the extra normalization steps needed by SDv could be straightforward
derived from the steps of SDu, we omit the detailed description of the extra
steps of SDv here.
– Step-3. SDu and SDv reduce U, V and Σ to k dimension, and compute
UkΣ
1
2
k
and Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
respectively, i.e. SDu holds UkΣ
1
2
k
and SDv holds Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
.
Let UkΣ
1
2
k
(c) denote the row of UkΣ
1
2
k
which contains the information of user
c and Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
(p) denote the column of Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
which contains the information
of restaurant p. The reputation score of restaurant p for user c is computed
as UkΣ
1
2
k
(c)Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
(p). Note that we use z-scores for normalization, so we do
not need to add the user average back as in [6].
– Step-4. SDu and SDv send UkΣ
1
2
k
(c) and Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
(p) to SDd for reputation
score computation. To prevent SDd from inferring information, SDu and SDv
randomize UkΣ
1
2
k
(c) and Σ
1
2
k
VT
k
(p) with W and S respectively. For example,
let ui denote the ith entry of UkΣ
1
2
k
(c), SDu randomizes it as ui + ziW + riS.
– Step-5. SDd multiplies the two randomized vectors and sends the result
scorep
′
to FD. Since FD knows W and S, it could recover the reputation
score as scorep = scorep
′
mod S mod W and send scorep to user c.
From the above description, it could be shown that the proposed framework
could be utilized to compose a recommendation system without any difficulties.
Also, note that in the above example, the server does not participate in the
process, which means the proposed framework completes all the workload in the
edge tier.
7.3 Data Compression
Since SVD could provide the best lower rank approximations of original data
matrix, it is largely applied for compressing data. The data compression of SVD
is quite straightforward: the matrix Σ chooses k largest diagonal values and sets
the rest as 0. U and V retain the corresponding k columns accordingly, then
the matrix UkΣkV
T
k
is the best rank k approximations of original matrix. In the
proposed framework, SDu and SDv could simply upload the trunked Uk , Σk and
Vk to server to achieve this purpose.
Besides the lower rank approximation, the eigenvectors from U could be
utilized to perform dimension reduction which is also a kind of data compression.
In the framework, SDu could randomize the eigenvectors corresponding to the
first several largest singular values. Then SDd could perform scalar product
between the randomized user data and the received randomized eigenvectors.
After the results of scalar product are recovered by SDu, it could upload the
dimension-reduced data to server.
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8 Related Works
In literature, there are a few works which are related to privacy-preserving
SVD computation. Polat et al. [21] proposed a SVD-based collaborative filter-
ing scheme in which the data privacy is protected by randomized perturbation.
However, their scheme has been proven unsecure by [22]. Note that the random-
ization in this work does not have the feature of the randomized perturbation
in [21]. Thus, the technique in [22] is infeasible for our work. Canny et al. [23]
proposed a collaborative filtering scheme which achieves the SVD computation
with privacy-preserving. However, their scheme is specifically designed for the
recommendation application. Han et al. [24] proposed a secure protocol for SVD
computation. However, their scheme could only support the computation be-
tween two parties. Hegeds et al. [25] proposed a private SVD computation for
low rank approximation in distributed P2P systems. Compared to our work,
the works in [23–25] have limited applications and require considerable itera-
tions for convergence which brings heavy overhead. Duan et al. [26] proposed
a privacy-preserving framework which supports the computation of the learn-
ing algorithms which could be expressed as iterative form. Their work could
support many learning algorithms while also requiring multiple rounds for the
convergence of algorithms, which brings considerable overhead. For example,
their scheme needs 83 minutes to compute the SVD for the Enron Email Data
set which is a 150 × 150 matrix while our work would need NC = 15 ciphertexts
to aggregate the 150-dimensional data for each of the 150 users and only takes
499 seconds in total. Note that the evaluation in [26] sums up the computation
time for all users even the computation of each user is actually performed con-
currently. For fair comparison, our evaluation also accumulates the computation
time of all users. Thus, the overall time cost is 4 × 55.493 × 150 × 15 = 499437
milliseconds.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, a flexible fog computing framework for privacy-preserving SVD
computation has been proposed. The framework divides the SVD calculation
into two eigenvector decomposition operations and distributes the two tasks to
different fog devices. The security analysis shows that the user data privacy
is preserved during transmission, aggregation and eigenvector decomposition.
The possible attacks from the second layer fog devices are also analyzed and
the resistance of the framework against the potential attacks is discussed. The
performance analysis has indicated the capacity of the framework and shows that
the data dimension is the most important factor influencing the efficiency of the
system. Moreover, three IoT applications are given as examples to demonstrate
that the proposed framework is flexible enough to adapt to different applications.
Compared with the existing works, our framework could support large scope of
applications with relatively small resource consumption.
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